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Abstract 
Market conforming institutions are a precondition for a thriving and stable economy. This is the upshot 
of the Washington consensus or, of somewhat earlier origin, the “Eucken hypothesis”. Another 
hypothesis of Eucken has it that market conforming institutions are the product of a strong state. 
However, more general and more important than the strong state is good governance. In this paper I 
refer to it as the “Lorenzetti hypothesis”. The paper tries to figure out the mechanisms by which good 
governance and economic order influence economic outcome. Then the two hypotheses are tested for 
two aspects of economic outcome: productivity as measured by GNP per capita over a wide range of 
countries and transformation success as measured by GNP growth over the European transformation 
countries. The tests confirm the theoretical expectation that good governance is more important than 
good order. 
JEL codes: O1, P2 
Keywords: Governance, Economic order, Development. 
1  Introduction 
In 1338-9 Ambrogio Lorenzetti painted frescos in a room of Palazzo Pubblico 
at Siena that have become famous under the name Buon governo – mal governo (Frugoni 
1988). What we see, is a confrontation of good and bad governance and their 
consequences for town and countryside. Good governance is represented by personified 
virtues: sapientia, iustitia, and this in both forms: commutativa and distributiva, concordia, fides, 
spes, caritas, pax, fortitudo, prudentia, magnanimitas, temperantia, and likewise personified vices 
for bad governance: tyrannia, avaritia, superbia, vana gloria, crudelitas, proditio, fraus, furor, 
divisio. The consequences for town and countryside are displayed in many details: in the 
case of good governance flourishing fields outside the walls and thriving commerce 
within under the heading securitas, in the case of bad governance violence, war, 
destruction under the heading timor.  
The iconographic program is a clear political economic theory which – freedom 
of the arts – produces simultaneously its empirical confirmation (Rubinstein 1958). The 
basic hypothesis reads: good governance creates security and trust and, hence, economic 
welfare; bad governance creates mistrust, anxiety, and uncertainty and, hence, is 
destructive. We will call it in the following the “Lorenzetti hypothesis”. It should be 
distinguished from the Hobbes hypothesis according to which any government is better 
than the unregulated state of nature. The “Lorenzetti hypothesis” is as old as political 
theory and can be traced back to Aristotle, as the concepts of iustitia commutativa and 
iustitia distributiva do already show. In his Politics Aristotle (1977) saw the ultimate 
                                                 
1 The author is indebted to Ms. Michaela Triebel for computational assistance and a referee and the 
participants of seminars at Groningen and Lörrach for helpful comments. 
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objective of good governance in happiness (eudaimonia) by which he, however, 
understood virtue and wisdom rather than economic welfare.  
Later, the so-called cameralists, 17
th and 18
th century German economists, have 
treated good governance under the name of good politics (gute Polizey) as one of their 
major research topics. The Aristotelian roots remained recognisable in the objective of 
economic policy – common happiness (Dithmar 1745: 134, see also Rieter 1993: 68), by 
which they understood welfare rather than Aristotle’s eudaimonia. It is quite astonishing 
that this topic has been lost in economic theorising and only recently made its 
reappearance under the heading of good governance. Bad experiences with neoclassical 
growth theory in the context of developing countries and the inability to explain by 
traditional factors of growth the puzzle “why growth rates differ” (Denison 1967) in a 
satisfactory way brought back to front stage the state and its political achievements in 
the process of development. Institutions matter and different equilibria can result, 
depending on whether they function well. 
Transformation of a totalitarian, basically administratively coordinated, system 
into a democratic one that is coordinated predominantly by markets and competition 
has been triggered by, among others, the perception of a serious deficit in welfare and 
happiness. It is a complex process: individuals' states of mind, entrepreneurial 
behaviour, and public policy will have to cooperate to get this process under way with a 
non-negligible chance of success. Public policy has a special task transforming the 
economic order by liberalisation, privatisation, stabilisation, and the installation of 
institutions that are essential for competition. It looks an impossible mission, since at 
the same time the political system has to be reconstructed from scratch. How the 
problem has been solved need not concern us here. What we see, 13 years after 
transformation began, are sufficiently differentiated success stories which make it 
possible to test our hypothesis: it was good governance that is responsible for success 
and bad governance for failure. 
The next section will pay more attention to the concept of governance. A 
theoretical support  of the hypothesis follows in section 3. Section 4 discusses the data 
that will be used in the empirical testing. The test is an ordinary regression model whose 
results will be discussed in section 5. In the conclusion we finally try to speculate about 
the causes of good or bad governance. 
2  Good governance 
The Greeks understood by the word πολιτεία, from which are derived terms like 
politics, policy, and police, such rules of a state on which its welfare is based. “So policy 
consists in a good order and constitution of persons and things of a community; 
political science teaches how the internal and external nature of a community can be 
preserved in good state for the happiness of the individual and all together. The internal 
nature of a state consists of the number of inhabitants, their Christian and virtuous life 
and conduct, health, civilisation, nourishment and wealth; the external, on the other 
side, consists of good order of persons and things as well as gracefulness of the 
country.” (Dithmar 1745: 133-4; the baroque flavour of the quote is unfortunately lost 
in translation). What he means by good governance, the author explains in detail 
enumerating the institutions that are indispensable for general welfare: fear of god, 
peace, justice, education, health, economic activity, communal rules and institutions, free 
trade, a monetary system, and a legal system. What he does not touch in detail, is  
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government itself. In a rather absolutist tradition he merely states: “Policy is based on 
civil society according to which the prince is entitled to govern the actions and things of 
his subjects to preserve the commonwealth” (ibid.) 
Modern discourse summarises the objects of good governance under the 
heading of social infrastructure which – in a good state – lowers transaction costs and 
allows for an undistorted formation of prices, with the result that economic subjects 
receive the greater part of the social benefits of their activities in the form of private 
income (Hall and Jones 1999: 84). Under bad governance substantial parts of the 
benefits are diverted against the will of the producers and distributed among people 
who did not contribute to their production and, hence, the producers will reduce their 
efforts after a certain period of time. A major element of social infrastructure is the 
economic system whose constitutive properties, as far as a competitive market order is 
concerned, have been known since Eucken (1952/1990: 254-89): 
 
a well-functioning price system 
a stable monetary system 
free entry and exit 
private property 
freedom of contract 
liability rules 
a stable economic policy. 
 
Beyond the economic system, and closely related to it, the legal system, health 
and education, as well as culture play a role, of which the latter Dithmar had enumerated 
under religion, civilisation, and gracefulness of the country. 
Social infrastructure is generally seen as a task of government. And this raises 
the question, to stay with Eucken (ibid.: 332), of: “How can the state become a power 
organizing a well functioning and free order of the industrialised economy?” (It should 
be noted that in German the abstract state is at issue, whereas in English one would 
rather ask about government.) This is again the same question about good governance, 
which Eucken too does not answer. The following definition of government in the 
sense of governance, and not in the legal sense, may be a point of departure: “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity 
of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999a: 1). The three 
quoted authors, a World Bank team researching social infrastructure, try to 
operationalise the definition by confronting indicators of good and bad governance 
following, probably unwittingly, the model of Lorenzetti. They identify indicators for 
democratic selection and control of government, for its political competence, and for 
the relation between state and citizens aggregating them in six antithetic clusters: 
 
Good governance     Bad governance 
Voice and accountability   Political instability and violence 
participation       unconstitutional  conduct 
democratic rights      interference of the military  
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freedom of press      political terrorism 
government effectiveness   regulatory burden 
transparent administration    incompetent personnel 
credibility     market  unfriendly  policies 
ability to compromise     ineffective judicial control 
rule  of  law     graft 
enforceability of contracts    corruption 
predictability of courts     state capture 
respect of the institutions    rent seeking 
 
These are examples of indicators that can be pigeon-holed in the six clusters. 
Briefly summarised good policy is democratically legitimated, effective and credible, 
whereas bad policy is unpredictable, costly, and corrupt. Such properties are created not 
only by the formal institutions and their implementation, but to a considerable extent 
also by informal institutions, attitudes, and culture – the social capital. 
3  Theoretical background 
The “Lorenzetti hypothesis” looks intuitively self-evident: good governance 
creates welfare. Yet how it works in detail requires a theoretical explanation. One can 
conceive of a system production function as a grand relationship (Koopmans, Montias 
1971, Kornai, 1971, Wagener 1979): 
 
(1) Y
t     =   h(E
t; S
t; P
t) 
(2)  S
t      =   {R
t; O
t} 
(3)  P
t   =   {PO
t; PI
t} 
(4)  W (Y
t)  =   W(y1 ... yj ...  ym),  j = 1 ... m   elements of the Y-vector. 
 
The time superscript, t, is omitted whenever it is not needed. 
Y is an m-dimensional vector of system outcomes over which performance is 
evaluated.  
W is the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function over the dimensions of Y. 
The preferences that are embodied in W, of whomsoever they may be, are culturally and 
historically determined. 
E denotes the system’s environment: external factors; which may include 
previous states of the system {Y
T-1, Y
T-2, …,  S
T-1, S
T-2, …,  P
T-1, P
T-2 …} – the problem 
of initial conditions of transformation, for instance, and the phenomenon of path 
dependency. 
P denotes the strategies or policies of the agents that can be directed onto 
different fields: 
PO are changes in the rules of the game or the economic and political order 
(constitutional policy). 
PI  denotes direct interference and influence upon the outcome (interventionist 
policy). 
The set P is not restricted to political or administrative agents, but encompasses 
also the strategies of private economic subjects – labour market decisions, investment, 
etc.  
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S  is the system, i.e. the set of institutions which determine the playing field of 
the agents as well as their decisions; in the terminology we have used above it may be 
seen as the social infrastructure consisting of 
O  comprises formal institutions, the constitutional order, that can be influenced 
and constructed by political decisions; by definition this is the object of transformation 
policies aiming at a concrete reconstruction of the political and economic order 
R  are informal institutions or rules of conduct, traditions, attitudes, mental 
models, knowledge, all of which are not immediately accessible by political influence; 
this complex can be summarised as culture or as social capital; for the moment it is a 
very inhomogeneous conglomerate. 
It looks, at first glance, as if governance could not be spotted in this taxonomy. 
The inhomogeneous conglomerate R does, however, contain variables that determine 
good or bad governance and thus influence directly the outcome Y. In the second 
instance, we may hypothesize indirect influences via P and O about whose generation 
nothing has been said as yet. 
In order to generate a model we have to discern exogenous and endogenous 
variables. Y is evidently endogenous, and E seems to be exogenous by definition. 
However, if E contains previous states of the system, {Y
T-1, Y
T-2, …, S
T-1, S
T-2, …, P
T-1, 
P
T-2, …}, it will be partly endogenised in a fully dynamic model: this is the phenomenon 
of path dependency. In simple words, the level of development is determined by policy, 
social infrastructure and social capital, but policy, social infrastructure and social capital 
will be influenced by the level of development. These variables show a kind of co-
evolution. The same may be said of W. Transformation is clearly a case of changing 
preferences which cannot be assumed given and constant. It is possible, however, to 
assume that the preferences of the agents or elites are given and constant, but different 
agents or elites replace one another in the course of transformation. The policy makers 
at time t after the turnaround are others than those before, at (t – τ), τ = 1,2, …. This 
change has not so-far been sufficiently researched. We consider the turnaround an 
external shock and treat the new preferences as given. It should be clear that they are 
among the most tenacious elements of the social capital R with a strong impact upon 
governance. The attitude towards the law or Dithmar’s fear of God comes to mind. 
The strategies P are endogenous. They are influenced by the external factors E, 
the constitutional order O and the social capital R which, as seen, contains the 
preferences W. All that happens in the minds of the agents, whom we may assume to 
know E, S and the model h. They  tune P in such a way that expected outcome Ŷ will be 
optimised.  
 
(5)      P*  =  arg max W
t (h (E
t; S
t; P
t)), and   Ŷ  =  h (E
t; S
t; P*) 
Other assumptions about the formation of P are also conceivable. By 
transformation we understand the conscious reconstruction of the economic and 
political order of a country, i.e. ∆O is at the centre of the exercise. Since O has been 
defined as those elements of the set of institutions that are accessible for political 
change, it is the result of constitutional policy 
 
(6)  O  =  k(PO) 
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The aim is an improvement in the system's outcome, Ŷ, howsoever it may be 
specified. Formation of P is influenced by O and R: constitutionally excluded or 
culturally tabooed policies, for instance, are outside the choice set. There are similar 
approaches to a political economy of policy reform, such as the theory of actor centred 
institutionalism (cf. Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Müller 1999). It explains policy choice by 
the actual situation E of the agents and by their modes of interaction determined by the 
structure of institutions S that constrain the agents. The policy maker need not be an 
optimiser, but can apply a rule of thumb, g,: 
 
(7)  P  =  g[E; S; W(Ŷ)] 
 
Good governance therefore has three major channels of influence: 
 
through the preferences or the system of values of the agents, 
through its impact upon the choice of strategies and policies by which the 
constitutional order as well as economic policy proper are determined, by which, above 
all, the individual economic subjects shape their decisions concerning production and 
investment, 
through its direct influence upon performance which modifies the impact of 
order and policy, i.e. their effectiveness, in the same manner as good management in a 
company enhances the commitment and productivity of the employees. 
 
Good governance implies good order and good policies. It could be sufficient, 
therefore, to concentrate upon these variables to explain differences in general welfare 
and in transformation success. This would imply that we should rely entirely upon the 
“Eucken hypothesis”. Eucken identified the crucial variables of PO: liberalisation (a well 
functioning price system and open markets), stabilisation (a stable monetary system and 
monetary policy), privatisation, the introduction of legal institutions that determine the 
rules of the game of competition (freedom of contract and liability rules) and a 
predictable government. And he assumed that a good order in these terms will produce 
welfare and growth. A similar program has become notorious under the name of the 
“Washington consensus” (Rodrik 1997). It has been criticised for neglecting the initial 
conditions, path dependency, institutions, the embeddedness of economic policy in 
politics and culture (e.g., Stiglitz 1999). In the context of our descriptive model it is quite 
plausible, however, that transformation policy should concentrate only upon those 
variables that are accessible to political influence, i.e., on the variables of O and P, at 
least in the short run. But regardless of how important these variables may be, 
transformation success will hardly be explained satisfactorily by O and P, even if there is 
good chance that a good policy choice is highly correlated with good governance, i.e. R.  
The proposition that “economic welfare depends on good governance” does not 
invalidate the conventional theory of growth that explains welfare or productivity of a 
system by the accumulation of physical and human capital. The “Lorenzetti hypothesis” 
takes only one step further back, asking under which conditions such accumulation will 
proceed continuously. And it holds that the economic subjects will exert sufficient 
efforts if they find themselves in an environment with as little uncertainty as possible 
and if they are to benefit as much as possible from the fruits of their efforts. If we test 
the hypothesis, we need not control for the traditional factors of growth. For they are  
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exactly the major material channel by which good governance becomes effective. 
Another factor of growth, on a similar level as good governance, for which one should 
therefore control, is natural endowment with resources. One may presume that richer 
countries will produce higher welfare than countries less favoured by nature.
2 
Numerous empirical studies of transformation get to the result which 
Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) have formulated succinctly: institutions matter in 
transition, but so do policies. Yet this is almost trivial, taking into account that 
transformation or the transition from a planned economy to market competition implies 
almost by definition a fundamental change of institutions and policies. In this context 
everything is important: politics, constitution and order, culture, social infrastructure, 
initial conditions, expectations (for instance, regarding integration in the European 
Union), actual policies, etc. The hypothesis to be tested here has it that good governance 
constitutes a primary factor of influence for successful transformation that works 
through formal and informal institutions and policies. 
In the case of transformation the problem of causality can perhaps be solved in 
favour of good governance. If Weder (2001: 7) holds that “richer countries have a 
higher quality of institutions for a variety of reasons”, she is implying a reverse causality. 
The question how these countries have become richer remains, however, unanswered. 
There is the co-evolution hypothesis: welfare and good governance develop over long 
periods of time, each individual sub-period of which recurrently linking up with the 
previous. In this context the proposition of Weder makes sense: rich countries are able 
to improve their social and institutional infrastructure more easily than poor ones and 
thus get richer. In transition we deal not only with richer and poorer countries, but also 
with those that overcome more or less rapidly the transformation crisis. And this may 
be ascribed, such is the hypothesis, not only to the initial conditions of welfare, but 
rather to social infrastructure or good governance. 
Good and bad governance did exist mutatis mutandis also under the communist 
regime. What did not exist by definition was the productivity enhancing economic order 
of market competition. So we may be able to discern the two influences, or the 
“Lorenzetti hypothesis” and the “Eucken hypothesis”, in this case. What does good or 
bad governance under the communist regime really mean? It was stated above that good 
governance implies a productive economic order, which certainly did not exist under 
communism. The reasons, however, were that communists had the conviction, a kind of 
a mental model regarding the function h in equation (1), that socialist planning creates a 
productive economic order, given the lack of contradictory experience. One may have 
qualms about speaking of good governance in the context of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and of totalitarian practices in socialist states. Only few of the indicators of 
governance which were formulated above seem to be relevant here: participation, 
democratic rights, freedom of the press versus unconstitutional behaviour, intervention 
by the military, political terrorism; transparent administration, credibility, ability to 
compromise versus incompetent personnel, system-incongruent regulations, deficient 
legal control; finally observation of the constitution by citizens and government, 
enforceability of contracts, independence of the judiciary, predictability of policy versus 
exercise of public power for private gains, corruption, state capture, and rent seeking. 
                                                 
2  Although this is by no means self-evident, and phenomena such as the Dutch disease and 
corruption, i.e. a deterioration of governance, in the presence of natural riches (Leite and Weidmann 
1999) show that this is not always the case.  
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Even if the level of governance on the whole was rather low by these standards, we can 
nevertheless discern – mutatis mutandis, of course – socialist countries with not so poor 
governance from those with very poor governance. 
A second meaning of good governance in the context of communist political 
and economic systems and their transformation is based on the fact that this is a 
phenomenon of longue durée. Putnam (1993) is speaking of centuries necessary to build 
up an efficient social infrastructure, even though a liberal competitive market order can 
be installed within a short period of time, as the actual transition has proved. Transition 
countries with high quality of governance, then, are such where corresponding traditions 
existed. During the communist period these qualities were dormant, they may even have 
worn down, since the communist system had a general tendency towards bad 
governance. The differences in governance which are to be found in the transition 
countries can, for a large part, be ascribed to the pre-communist period. In this context 
one should remember the fact that the Soviet system has been introduced in most 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the tip of the bayonets of the Red Army, 
and it collapsed as soon as these bayonets were withdrawn. 
Testing alternatively the “Lorenzetti hypothesis” vs. the “Eucken hypothesis”, 
or the “Washington consensus”, implies to document the different impact of a free 
market order and good governance. The basic hypothesis assumes that a competitive 
order is a precondition for success of transformation which finally comes with good 
governance. Since both, the constitutional order O and social infrastructure R, show 
strong collinearity – for we hold that a good order is the result of good governance, we 
cannot use them as control variables for each other (see Section 5). It is to be 
demonstrated that differences in transformation success cannot satisfactorily be 
explained by the institutionalisation of a market order: liberalisation, stabilisation, and 
privatisation. This would back the critics of the “Washington consensus” who 
underlined the importance of other institutions and social infrastructure. It does not 
imply, however, that the policy of the “Washington consensus” was wrong. 
Seen over a longer period of time, governance is a highly tenacious variable. If 
we encounter good governance in year t, there is a high probability that we would have 
encountered good governance in year t - τ, τ = 1, 2, …, too. It follows that time lags are 
not needed when estimating the influence of governance – this is what the co-evolution 
hypothesis is about. Things are slightly different in the case of the economic order. It 
can be changed at rather short notice and then it needs a certain period of time until this 
change will show its effect. If we encounter a competitive and free order at time t, the 
probability of having encountered a similar order at time t – τ will be smaller than in the 
first case, even if the probability in conjunction with good governance, is positive. Here 
time lags do matter.  
4  The data 
The elements of good governance enumerated by Lorenzetti or Dithmar can be 
ascertained only subjectively. Nothing has changed in this respect with recent data about 
governance. We have subjective estimates of governance quality of a country which are 
produced by “experts” (e.g., international organisations, so-called think tanks, NGOs), 
by business people or by ordinary citizens. Comparable estimates presuppose 
comparable knowledge of individual countries. Business people who trade with different 
countries may be able to make such comparisons. However, they will rarely trade with  
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all countries with similar intensity. That leads to a differentiation in their perception. 
Data on governance, which are based only upon such individual observations, will 
therefore exhibit extreme variations. Somewhat more reliable should be data that 
aggregate subjective evaluations. The aggregated data are averages, most probably with 
wide deviations. In short, data on governance should be treated very carefully, since they 
are liable to show even greater errors than economic data in general.  
The data on governance which are used here have been compiled by a research 
team of the World Bank and have been updated once (Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoito-
Lobatón 1999b, 2002). They aggregate pre-aggregated observations of governance 
indicators, which have been published by 15 different institutions. This procedure 
estimates the unobserved governance components, namely the six clusters mentioned in 
section 2, from data on observed indicators. The reader is referred to the original 
source
3 for the model's assumptions and the exact method used. The result are point 
estimates and standard deviations for the governance components: 
 
voice and accountability 
political stability 
government effectiveness 
regulatory quality 
rule of law 
control of corruption. 
 
For our purposes we have aggregated the six point estimates again by calculating 
their arithmetic mean. Standard deviations were lost by this procedure. But the general 
warning of the authors, not to over-interpret minor differences in governance quality, 
remains fully valid. The original observations are for the years 1997/8 and 2000/01 and 
the data are available for 175 countries among which are all transition countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We selected a sample of 103 countries 
from all continents which by their size are of some importance and where the number 
of original observations was large enough to make the estimate of governance quality 
more or less reliable. 
To test the “Eucken hypothesis” we need data on the institutionalisation of a 
competitive market order. The components which have been mentioned as relevant can 
be observed more objectively even if it may not be so in every individual case. This may 
warrant reliance on a single source of data. We use the so-called “Economic Freedom 
Index” (EFI; whose description and critical evaluation can be found in Voigt 2002: 147-
66, and whose most recent data are in Gwartney et al. 2002). It is an aggregated index 
whose individual indicators comprise seven components: 
 
size of government activity 
state or market coordination 
monetary policy and price stability 
currency convertibility  
rule of law and security of property rights 
openness and free trade 
financial markets 
                                                 
3 (Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoito-Lobatón 1999b).  
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The seven components are not fully congruent with Eucken’s elements of a 
competitive market order, but the correspondence is sufficient for our purposes. The 
EFI is available for the years 1999 and 2000/01 and for 123 countries, including the 
accession candidates for the European Union in Eastern Central Europe as well as 
Croatia, Albania, Russia and Ukraine.  
The progress of reform of the transition countries has regularly been evaluated 
since 1994 by the EBRD. The progress of transformation is measured for nine 
components (an exact description is to be found in EBRD 2002: 20-1): 
 
large-scale privatisation 
small-scale privatisation 
corporate governance and restructuring 
price liberalisation 
trade and foreign exchange system 
competition policy 
banking reform and interest rate liberalisation 
financial markets 
infrastructure 
 
The elements of O that are covered can be compared to the elements of O 
contained in EFI even if individual indicators differ and will certainly be differently 
operationalised. We calculated the unweighted arithmetic mean to obtain a general 
transformation indicator. It is available, evidently, only for the transition countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We use the data for the year 
2002. 
As to the outcome variables Y, it has become customary to measure 
transformation success by real GDP compared to the starting year 1989 (= 100). 
Transformation aims at improving the economic conditions of the people. This target 
could be reached only by the detour through a deep and extended transformation crisis, 
whose severity differed among the transition countries. The chosen indicator of success 
therefore shows how rapidly the crisis has been overcome and to what extent the 
original target has been reached. There are many problems linked to the indicator, 
however, among which are the comparison of national income data of planned and 
market economies, the size of the shadow economy, and inflation. The most recent set 
of data is published for the year 2001 by EBRD (2002: 58). 
Since the “Lorenzetti hypothesis” relates to the effect of governance upon 
system outcomes, i.e. economic welfare, the chosen indicator is GDP per capita 
measured in purchasing power parities. Comparisons of national data are not problem 
free. Eurostat (2003), for instance, calculates such data for the 15 EU member states 
and the accession candidates plus Croatia, Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine. A much 
wider coverage is to be found in Maddison (2001) whose data we use for the 103 
countries of the large sample. Comparisons of Eurostat and Maddison shows that they 
do not always correspond, even not for statistically solid countries like the EU member 
states. Deviations should be considered normal and can be ascribed to differences in 
methods, above all in the calculation of purchasing power parities.  
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Finally the control variables. The most important control variable for the 
relation between governance and welfare is, as we have argued above (see Section 3), the 
countries’ endowment with natural resources. We have taken fuel as most important 
single resource and introduced a dummy for countries with important oil and gas 
reserves. A dummy for transformation countries should test whether or not they have 
returned to the fold of “normal” countries. This may be interpreted as a disguised time 
lag if their welfare does not fully correspond to their governance quality or their 
economic order. Three regional dummies, for the EU, for Africa and for Latin America, 
are also added. The latter seem to be relevant only in connection with EFI which 
appears to be systematically overestimated for Latin America. The one for the EU is 
derived from the observation that some EU member states, mainly in the South and the 
West, exhibit a comparatively low governance quality without recognisable effect upon 
welfare. It can be hypothesized that EU membership constitutes a governance quality of 
its own. Africa is an almost hopeless case of development policy where other forces 
seem to be at work which are not covered by the governance indicators. A usual control 
variable of success of transformation is the initial conditions, represented here by GDP 
per capita at purchasing power parities in 1990 (Maddison 2001). 
5  Results 
In the first instance, the “Lorenzetti hypothesis” should be tested for a broad 
sample of countries: does good governance bring about higher welfare? GDP per capita 
for 1998 (GDP) is regressed on governance for the year 1997/8 (GOV). The scatter 
diagram indicates that the relation is not linear. Therefore a quadratic function is 
estimated. Five dummies serve as control variables: three regional ones (Latin America, 
Africa and EU-15), one for countries with sizeable fuel reserves and one for transition 
countries. Alternatively the “Eucken hypothesis” is tested: does a competitive and free 
economic order bring about higher welfare? Here, the independent variable is the 
Economic Freedom Index for the year 1999 (EFI). The same control variables are used. 
We expect “Lorenzetti” to have a higher explanatory value than “Eucken”. The results 
follow in Table 1. 
The expectation is validated: “Lorenzetti” (column 1) does explain more than 
“Eucken” (columns 2 and 3), but both exhibit an unexpectedly good fit. A coefficient of 
determination of .86 for the correlation between welfare and governance in a sample of 
103 countries raises some sceptical doubts. Could it not be the case that individual 
observations of governance quality are biased toward the much more obvious levels of 
welfare? Such a bias cannot be excluded. However, it is highly improbable. The 
governance indicator is composed of many individual observations of sub-indicators 
which are not collinear. Furthermore, the relationship is quadratic, which would 
overstrain the individual observers. We may accept the result: good governance explains 
a great deal of welfare differences in the world. The competitive and free economic 
order is evidently an important instrument by which good governance influences the 
productivity of an economy. But the good order has to be filled with life and thus 
constitution conforming behaviour and a culture of trust become a second channel 
along which governance exerts its influence. Under conditions of good order, stability 
and trust the necessary accumulation of physical and human capital enabling welfare 
takes place. As expected the indicator of good order, EFI, and the governance indicator 
exhibit a high correlation (column 4).  
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Table 1: OLS estimates of regressions for the level of welfare 
  GDP  GDP  GDP  EFI 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant 23.43***
 
(9.05) 
39.08 
(1.39) 
-7.18 
(-1.07) 
6.27*** 
(39.53) 
GOV  21.59*** 
(13.34) 
   1.52*** 
(11.07) 
GOV
2  7.05*** 
(5.00) 
    
EFI   -14.43* 
(-1.69) 
  
EFI
2   1.99*** 
(3.04) 
0.9*** 
(8.36) 
 
Africa   -12.10*** 
(-3.23) 
-18.32*** 
(-3.42) 
-17.38*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.13 
(-0.47) 
Latin America   -5.87* 
(-1.83) 
-18.39*** 
(-4.35) 
-19.13*** 
(-4.50) 
0.76*** 
(3.34) 
EU-15   2.34 
(0.63) 
13.65*** 
(2.85) 
14.09*** 
(2.91) 
-0.21 
(-0.78) 
Transformation   -6.09** 
(-2.01) 
-3.16 
(-0.62) 
-2.84 
(-0.56) 
-0.78*** 
(-3.17) 
Natural resources   7.23*** 
(2.72) 
8.77** 
(2.05) 
10.98*** 
(2.66) 
 
R
2 0.86  0.75  0.74  0.73 
N 103  87  87  87 
See text for definition of variables. Asterisks denote significance levels: * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
(t-ratios in parentheses). 
 
As far as the control variables are concerned, they show the expected signs 
although the parameters are not always significant. Fuel reserves improve welfare, other 
things equal. The status of a transition country has a significant negative impact only in 
the context of governance quality (column 1). The difference with order as the 
independent variable, where this influence is not significant, is reflected also in the 
relation between EFI and GOV (column 4): quality of economic order is lower than 
expected by governance quality. This result supports the hypothesis of a hidden time 
lag: the economic order of transition countries is not in full correspondence with their 
governance traditions and therefore they show a certain welfare gap in this respect. The 
statement of Weder (2001), that transition economies are again “normal” cases, has to 
be slightly modified.  
Membership of EU has a positive influence upon welfare. However, it is 
significant only with respect to the indicator of order EFI (columns 2 and 3). Two 
different reasons may be surmised. The “Economic Freedom Index” is based upon a 
rigidly liberal theory. The more social-liberal economic systems of the European 
continent come off rather badly compared to the more orthodox Anglo-American 
systems. If there are qualities in a social-liberal system, EFI will underestimate them, as 
our results seem to indicate. A second reason for a positive EU effect could be found in  
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the fact that part of government competency within the EU moves to Brussels, i.e. that 
local governance qualities are superimposed by EU governance qualities. Gillingham 
(2003: 45), for instance, ascribes the extra-ordinary Italian EU support to the conviction 
“that government from any European capital had to be better than that from Rome”. 
This may be good news for accession countries in Eastern Central Europe which have 
lower governance qualities than incumbent EU members. For they can expect to benefit 
from the governance lead of the EU. There are even indications that they already did so 
in the pre-accession period. The group of candidates differs significantly in governance 
from the group of non-candidates or not-yet-candidates. Implementing the acquis 
communautaire as pre-condition of accession may have such beneficial effects. However, 
it is difficult to discern the effect of governance traditions and EU candidate status: 
according to its Copenhagen conditions the EU accepts as new members only countries 
that have a certain governance quality and a competitive and free market order. 
Finally the two remaining regional dummies. No further comments are 
necessary with regard to Africa. The Latin America dummy shows a strong negative 
impact in connection with the indicator of economic order (columns 2 and 3). The 
relation between EFI and GOV (column 4) makes clear that compared to its 
governance quality the economic order in Latin American countries seems to be 
significantly more developed. Two effects may be at work. The first would be an 
observation bias on the side of the makers of the Economic Freedom Index. 
Alternatively it is conceivable that the economic order in Latin America has been 
reconstructed during the last years in accordance with the “Washington consensus” 
which had been formulated in the 1980s exactly for that region and which was imposed 
by Washington. The improved order did not yet result in a corresponding improvement 
in welfare – another instance of a disguised time lag. In addition, the change of order 
does not yet correspond to the existing long run governance quality – the latter should 
adapt in an upward direction to make the former really effective, which may be taken as 
another proof of “Lorenzetti” dominating “Eucken”. 
Constitutional policy is at the centre of transformation. We will have to test our 
two hypotheses now for the case of transformation. Economic success will be measured 
by the growth of real GDP for the period 1989 - 2001 (∆GDP). The independent 
variable for “Lorenzetti” is the governance indicator for 2000/01 (GOV). The 
alternative “Eucken hypothesis” explains growth by a competitive market order. In this 
case the transformation index of EBRD for 2002 (TR) is preferable to EFI, since the 
number of observations is greater (27 instead of 14). The initial conditions are 
represented by GDP per capita at purchasing power parities for the year 1990 (GDP). 
Our sample consists of 25 transition countries, excluding Bosnia and Yugoslavia. The 
results are given in Table 2: 
Both equations have been estimated twice, first for the total sample and then 
excluding Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The second estimate is considerably 
better. The reason is quite simple: Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have not really 
started their transition and have therefore not yet suffered a real transformation crisis. 
At the same time their governance quality is estimated rather low. Therefore they should 
be dropped from the sample.  
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Table 2: OLS estimates of regressions for transformation success 
  ∆GDP  ∆GDP  ∆GDP  ∆GDP  TR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant 119.55*** 
(7.51) 
121.53*** 
(9.35) 
53.29** 
(2.16) 
-55.79* 
(-1.77) 
2.98*** 
(51.25) 
GOV  30.89*** 
(3.81) 
41.93*** 
(5.97) 
   0.82*** 
(9.60) 
TR    12.68 
(1.25) 
55.33*** 
(4.36) 
 
GDP90  -0.005** 
(-2.10) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.009 
(-0.37) 
-0.004* 
(2.00) 
 
R
2 0.40  0.66  0.07  0.51  0.79 
N 25  22  25  22  27 
See text for definition of variables. Asterisks denote significance levels: * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. 
(t-ratios in parentheses). 
 
Again we find that “Eucken” (columns 3 and 4) is weaker than “Lorenzetti” 
(columns 1 and 2): good governance is more than installing market-conforming 
economic order. But again we find that good governance is predominantly effective 
through the channel of a good order. Regressing TR on GOV (column 5) we can add 
Bosnia and Yugoslavia, for which the relevant data are available, to the sample. And we 
need not exclude the three unrepentant autocracies, since their low governance quality 
should be reflected in their constitutional policy. This is not self-evident. For Hellman, 
Jones and Kaufmann (2000) hold that state capture, a clear case of bad governance, is 
found mainly in intermediate situations and not where either transformation has not yet 
started or where it is almost accomplished. Our data do not support this hypothesis for 
governance in general. The impact of the control variable GDP is significant in three of 
the four estimates. The negative sign, however, is somewhat unexpected: the higher is 
productivity in 1990 the lower is economic growth for the period 1989-2001. 
Theoretically it could be explained as a catching up effect. It should, as well, not be 
overlooked that the source of data for the initial conditions (Maddison 2001) gives 
rather high estimates of per capita GDP at purchasing power parities for the Soviet 
republics or their successor states. The Baltic states, for instance, come off higher than 
Poland or Hungary. Although this does not fit with corresponding estimates of EBRD 
and Eurostat, it is not entirely implausible. For it is in line with our information about 
pre-transformation Soviet regional development. Since all Soviet successor states 
experienced a deep and, for most, also an extended transformation crisis, this may 
explain the negative sign. 
6  Conclusion 
Even in a competitive economic order the market and the state are inseparably 
intertwined (Wagener 2002). This statement is quite trivial, since a well functioning 
market system does not emerge from spontaneous self-organisation, and an organised 
self-organisation implies precisely the democratic state. A precondition for a productive 
and stable economy is a constitution and order in conformity with the market. This is 
exactly the “Eucken hypothesis” or the “Washington consensus”. The precondition of a 
well functioning competitive order is a strong state. This additional hypothesis of  
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Eucken needs clarification. For what is a strong state? The socialist state, subject to the 
principle of democratic centralism, was certainly a strong state. The strong state that can 
institutionalise and keep up a market economy must be different and must obey the 
principle of subsidiarity. The “Lorenzetti hypothesis” goes one step further back: it is 
not so much a strong state than good governance which brings about economic welfare. 
And good governance is a social phenomenon which is not restricted to the state, but 
includes attitudes and behaviour of economic subjects or the citizens, in particular their 
attitudes towards the state and the law. It is the collaboration of formal and informal 
institutions, the social infrastructure, which determine the way how the market and the 
state complement each other and bring about economic welfare. 
To test such a hypothesis is not an easy task. For the conglomerate “social 
infrastructure” is composed of most different components that in addition are difficult 
to perceive in a comparative manner. One has to make do with rather fuzzy data sets. 
Such data have been collected in recent years, making possible an attempt at testing. The 
results support the “Lorenzetti hypothesis”: where freedom, security and trust prevail 
the economy flourishes, where they are lacking the costs of long-term investments are 
too high (see also Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón 1999a, Raiser et al. 2001). Causality 
is a problem. If a high level of development correlates with good governance, it may be 
interpreted as support for the so-called “Lipset hypothesis” stating that democracy 
follows economic welfare. Barro (1997: 86), among others, has confirmed the latter. 
The most important instrument of good governance is a competitive market 
order which produces sustainable welfare and growth. This proposition is not disproved 
by our data. However, what has been called the “Eucken hypothesis” is weaker than the 
“Lorenzetti hypothesis”, in conformity with our theoretical considerations. For good 
governance influences the economic process through other channels too, above all 
through attitudes and informal institutions, i.e. through the social infrastructure that 
enhances the effectiveness of formal institutions. Such has also been the critique of the 
“Washington consensus” (see Stiglitz 1999, e.g.). However, one should not throw away 
the baby with the bathwater. Liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation are important 
preconditions of transformation success and they refer to the elements O of the 
economic system S that are amenable to political formation. It is only logical that 
economic policy should concentrate upon these elements. The social infrastructure R, 
the informal institutions and attitudes, may be as important or even more so, but they 
cannot be influenced in the short run. 
A solid social infrastructure, like Rome, has not been built in one day. Putnam 
(1993) considers it the result of cultural development over centuries. This makes the 
question of causality a problem of the chicken and the egg: welfare and good 
governance have developed concomitantly. In the context of transformation we have to 
do with much shorter periods of time. It may therefore help to discern more clearly 
cause and effect: good governance – consolidation and growth, bad governance – crisis 
and stagnation. The initial conditions of the transition countries seem to be quite 
similar: a socialist society with one party rule and a planned economy on the basis of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nevertheless, even there one can discern good and bad 
governance. The extent of socialist lawfulness, planning security, cronyism and 
corruption differed widely between East Berlin and Tashkent. And a good deal of the 
cause of such variations can be found in the pre-socialist history of these countries. The 
rule of law, for instance, is a rather familiar concept for Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and 
Slovaks, much less so for Kirgisians, Tadzhiks, and Uzbeks.  
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If short run transformation success can be explained by good governance, the 
major impact comes from a distant past when social infrastructure, political culture and 
economic welfare co-evolved. Leninist legacies, if they could be detected, would be of 
rather recent origin. A very short run influence upon the governance structure of 
transition countries stems from their geographical and political distance from Brussels 
(cf. Fischer, Sahay, Vegh 1998;, Wagener 2000). Joining the European Union is linked to 
certain minimum standards of good governance and at the same time accession 
candidates have to adopt a whole body of formal rules which will import covertly 
certain mental models, too. Nevertheless, countries like Bulgaria and Romania, officially 
recognised accession candidates, show much lower governance qualities than the 
Eastern Central European candidates and therefore cannot fulfil the Copenhagen 
conditions. That is to say, a possible short run positive EU effect cannot fully 
compensate for long run cultural conditioning.  
Integral transformation of former socialist countries is a process which 
comprises not only the economic, but also the legal and political system of a country. 
Where state and market are under reconstruction at the same time, the former will 
hardly be able to perform its ordering function effectively. This raises the question how 
some countries, mainly in Eastern Central Europe, more or less succeeded in 
accomplishing the transformation task while others, mainly in Eastern Europe, are 
lagging considerably behind. In this historical situation a strong state was not at hand. It 
seems to have been good governance – something else than a strong state and, in the 
end, a precondition of the latter – which is responsible for the achievement. Within a 
functioning social infrastructure the almost impossible task of a total reconstruction of 
formal social institutions was achieved in a short period of time so that these countries 
are able to accede to the EU in 2004. Explaining the differences in social infrastructure 
in the region remains a desideratum for future research. 
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